

MIGRATION AND THE EU’S AND ROMANIA’S CHALLENGES

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Abstract *The European Union is one of the world’s regions with an increased attractiveness degree for migrants from the entire world in the present troubled geopolitical and economic context at international level due to its economic development, social and political stability which are all mirrored in the living conditions and the quality of life from the developed countries of the EU. The Lisbon Agenda proposed the change of the EU in one of the most attractive regions for working, studying and researching. Almost 20 years after this ambitious Agenda, Europe is faced with the challenges of uncontrolled migration, that led to numerous critical attitudes and to increased risks for the entire Euro Area, associated with the absence of some formal and informal institutional structures in the economic and social field that would build up operational mechanisms for solving multiple challenges. Romania, as member-country of the EU is faced with several demographic risks and the risks of continuing human capital and labour force depletion as result of the process of labour migration. However, the most concerning phenomenon is the one of migration for education reflected in the massive migration of the young and working age population.*

The present paper intends a brief presentation of the main challenges at EU and national level, as well as an analysis of the links between migration and institutional arrangements in the field of education and labour market contributing to this phenomenon.

Key words: migration, institutions, demographic risk, education, labour market

JEL Classification: F22, I21, I23, I29, O17

1. Introduction

The current social context is strongly influenced by the economic context, while the economy, as a whole is faced with a set of questions to which the answers are found much easier in the field of sociological inquiry. One phenomenon with deep roots in public interest and in the policy fields of both economy and sociology is the migration phenomenon that accompanied the historical development of nations and states right from the beginning. The migration wave by the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century tends to change the political, economic and social context as some components of the phenomenon, as such, have been less approached at global, European and national level. Firstly, the institutional dimension of the relationship between economy and sociology regarding migration seems to have been somewhat neglected, a fact highlighted by the absence of a universal/general governance framework for migration as phenomenon, and for the various types of migration in particular. The absence of a clear governance frameworks makes it more difficult on one hand to manage the intensified migration waves at world level, and on the other hand to deliver a tool for managing it in both host- and origin countries.

Such a tool would be useful in operating the necessary distinctions between the various types of migrants, and would contribute to clarifying the necessary legal aspects related to migration, migration management and assistance as necessary, and as the recent refugee crisis of (2015) has proven, especially with respect to mitigating crises of the migration processes.

At UN level several formal multilateral institutions exist that serve the goals of such global governance, however, the scope exceeds these formal frameworks, fact proven by the subsequent emergence of regional institutions, and inter-state cooperation institutions and agreements have been developed. Nevertheless, all these institutions have shown weaknesses in dealing with the aforementioned crisis of 2015. This proves, once again that migration as phenomenon, and as developing process seems to create own institutional, sometimes ad-hoc settings, that tend either to

reinforce, sanction, negotiate or re-negotiate various state behaviours in the field of policy choices and attitudes towards the main and emerging types of migration [1].

Considering that migration, in general, and migration for labour in particular are both outcomes of the much wider process of globalisation, the absence of institutions associated directly, indirectly and by induced effects to the various and increasingly more specialised and diversified types of migration and/or mobility has effects that show directly into changing economic and social conditions in sending and receiving countries, as well.

Europe, and in particular the member-states of the European Union, is faced with several issues and conundrums on which migration has impact, to which it might provide for answers and, at the same time, to which it adds with respect to several discontent displays in society, thus contributing to a changed, and more complicated not only political, but also economic, social and cultural environment.

The main conundrums are reflected in the economic and social area, and the implications are deep, as several of these issues need solving at institutional, i.e. governance and organizational level [2].

The first conundrum is associated with demographic ageing and the need of managing and compensating demographic change. Demographic change has implications for the economy, in particular to demand and supply on the labour market, but also for the education system and the society, in general. In this respect, worrying developments are emerging in Romania, as entire rural areas age and will soon be quasi-depopulated, while the young labour force migrated either in one of the development poles inside the country, or outside the country. A very used pattern is using migration inside the country as platform for later migration abroad, after using the time as worker/employee in one or another public and/or private company for improving and gaining new skills and competences, that will be further developed abroad and valorised for career advancement and building a life in another country of the EU or the world.

The education system feels also the pressure of decreasing cohorts of young generations enrolling at all levels – from primary to tertiary education – while the reform of the system continues (still, after 27 years!) and new and innovative approaches for creating links between education and the world of work still need reinforcement. This situation at Romania's level has thus implication on the future economic growth, productivity and competitiveness of the country.

However, if we analyse attentively the evolution of the demographic natural increase we find that it is positive at the level of EU-28(27) and negative at the level of Romania. The caveat is associated with the data scarcity regarding the number of Romanian migrants. The more so, no relatively certain data are provided about either definitive or temporary migration of the Romanian citizens. This is an issue yet to be approached, in order to improve the up to now unsatisfying management of the types and motivations of migration at national level, in particular for young individuals.

The second major challenge is to exceed the uncertainties of the post-crisis. These uncertainties are the ones dictating nowadays increasingly more restrictive policies with respect to migrants' entry on the national labour markets in developed member-states, and even in developing ones as fears increase at the level of the nationals about jobs, social services and other types of welfare that might suffer under the added pressure of immigrants.

These pressures need to be addressed as there are several services' and service sectors, from IT to health-care and social services that will demand an increase in the numbers of labour force in the future due to the predominant trend of European ageing.

The third issue is to ensure the optimum balance on the labour market under the conditions in which the industrial transition, and in general the transition of the economy has contributed to increased and stronger jobs' polarisation and the disappearance of 'traditional' workplaces. The concern about the future of European and national jobs needs to be addressed by emphasising that migration, in general, and labour migration in particular has beneficial effects for productivity and

competitiveness, as the interaction between various work, creation and innovation cultures often contributes in generating increased value-added for final products, goods and services.

Finally, the fourth challenge is related to the migration phenomenon itself, and the implications it has on optimally managing and calibrating the economic and social institutions associated with the phenomenon, as the necessity of reconfiguring some of these institutions to meet the challenges of the 21st century is anticipated currently by increasingly more experts [3].

One of the best-documented types of migration in studies and analyses is the migration for labour based on superior economic expectations than the ones that can be provided by the national economy at a given moment. The impact has been studied extensively in the specialised literature [4], in particular for the countries of destination, but much less debated is the impact for the same periods with respect to the countries of origin, as few information, data and documentation exist that might serve the purposes of an institutional analysis [5].

However, there are several debates underpinning the intensification of circular migration, and the contribution of value added knowledge, of higher-skills also for the countries of origin next to the countries of destination [6],[7] while European perceptions regarding migration from Central, Eastern and South- Eastern Europe continue to mirror distorted images, contradicted by statistical data [8],[9].

In Romania, the impact of migration on main outcomes of the economy and society are triggering increasingly the pressing necessity of (re)modelling policies dedicated to the – potentially migrant – human capital. The institutional viewpoint (in the present paper institutions are understood according to the meaning promoted mainly by North, 1990)[10] and the institutions’ impact on the migration phenomenon [11],[12] needs to be included within the concerns of experts because of the mutually reinforcing relationships established between migration and the essential and determinant components of economic growth, competitiveness, and development. One of the noticeable displays of this trend is the recent migration for education from Romania, which includes increased risks related to: demographic changes, human capital competitiveness, active labour force, etc. Young individuals opting for higher education in the developed member-states, or who have graduated migrate in order to finalise their master/doctor studies, or for scientific, research-development purposes. They are the ones who often forego returning in the country or, if they return, they return for limited and very often short time. This ‘wave of young individuals seeking educational and/or career development’ is a phenomenon on increase at the level of our country since the accession to the European Union. Hence, this migration for education has all the features of a phenomenon indicating unfavourable institutional developments at national level, and even highlights the institutional arrangements and frameworks that fail in satisfying the expectations of the generations born after 1989.

The paper is intended as a brief analysis of this migration for education phenomenon by stipulating in this context another caveat: these are all estimates as national statistical data, including Eurostat data do not provide for a complete image, and information is collected also from other various sources from country and abroad.

2. Developments of the EU-28 emigration and immigration – an institutional viewpoint

2.1 EU-28 developments regarding migration

Already before the outbreak of the crisis, the policies of the European Union in the field of migration have given room to debates and differing opinions. The institutions and policies built around the four freedoms (goods, services, capital and people) with the implication of free movement of labour have been received differently at the level of the member-states, irrespective of their development level, as the differences in institutions and policy approaches between them are (almost) unavoidable and obvious.

In order to ensure wider acceptability, and to lay the bases for the further economic growth, competitiveness and sustainable development at EU level, two terms were coined and joined together: one ‘borrowed’ from the US, respectively concept of mobility, and the concept of flexibility.

The second term has deep implications both for migration and for the labour market, as it outstretches to cover both areas: it is a known fact that mobility in Europe is much lower than the one of the US, thus ‘flexibility’ was regarded as a way to encourage increased mobility in search of jobs and, possibly better wages, as the term was embedded in labour market policies to reflect the swift and increasingly deeper changes in terms of contract agreements, work time, forms/types of work, etc.

Most recent trends have shown that up to 2011, the first year after the Great Recession, migration still increased at a slower pace despite the impact of the crisis. However, by the end of 2015 a total of 4.7 million people immigrated in one or another member-state of the EU, and 2.8 million emigrants have left the EU in absolute numbers, including here also the flows between various EU member-states [Eurostat]. 2015 was the year of inflection, when the refugee crisis highlighted the institutional, governance and organizational failures, regarding migration policies both with respect to migrants (regarded as economic migrants, respectively in search of better employment and earnings), refugees and asylum seekers.

These failures had several outcomes with negative impacts on the EU as a whole: from Brexit to various changes in the policy replies of the member-states, aimed to mitigate the risks of higher waves of labour migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in their countries.

The fact that among the first policy measures to be revised were labour market policies shows the relevance and direct link between labour market and migration, as the link might be better analysed and conclusions would be better drawn by considering also the institutional aspects from the ones aimed at the conditions of entry into the country, to those aimed at integrating migrants.

This is why the measures considered by the states faced with the highest waves of immigration that threatened their support systems for all types of migrants, including here also refugees and asylum seekers, first addressed labour market policies – and the institutions configuring them, i.e. rules were replaced by new rules with regard to the entry of immigrants in the country, their status on entry (for example, Italy criminalised migrants in irregular situations), and after policies and new legislation was enforced according to new or changed rules, programmes were implemented for encouraging return of immigrants to their countries of origin (for example, Spain). Moreover, adjustment of rules was employed as well, especially in the United Kingdom by introducing stricter labour market tests and establishing lower numerical quotas. To which heightened monitoring of rules application was added in several countries [13].

Increasingly more often, in this context, the term of ‘circular migration’ was suggested in the framework of EU debates and policy drafting, as it seems to cover two important aspects: i) ensuring the necessary platform for the global approach of migration in order to achieve some type of global governance and/or management of the phenomenon, and ii) ensures the starting point for several policies in the framework of ‘neighbourhood’ policies, that might contribute on one hand to higher mobility, and on the other hand to dealing with still present issues with respect to the free movement of labour within the EU.

Circular migration seems to be, at EU-28 level, a promising approach as it would allow to augment EU-level, but also national, inter- and intra-regional flows of people that share an area consisting of several countries included into a single economic space [14]. In this paper were identified the four main dimensions of circular migration: (i) the spatial dimension in which circular migrants oscillate between two poles: one in the sending- and the other in the receiving country and, if the migrant becomes more specialised in his/her type of activity, it can even comprise several poles (for instance in the case of businessmen, freelancers in various activities,

etc.); (ii) the time dimension referring to the length of stay in the receiving country ranging from a couple of months to years, implying also the so-called life-cycle move (on retiring returning to the country of origin), depending on the type of activity (for instance, seasonal, short-term contract based for skilled labour) etc.; (iii) iterative dimension meaning repeating patterns between country of origin and the same and/or different migration destinations and, finally (iv) the developmental dimension which is the most relevant one, because here benefits might be identified and assessed for both country of origin and country of destination.

2.2. Developments of migration patterns in Romania

Romania underwent a transition period of over 25 years that imposed the structural reform of all systems – from the political one, to the social and cultural ones. The strongest impact was on the economy and the painful reforms affecting the main systems with direct impact on economic growth and social development: industry, education, health, and culture.

Transition meant the cumbersome shift to free market economy, translated during the first transition period of the nineties into massive downsizing of activities in industrial sectors, even dismembering of some large industrial complexes and massive layoffs of skilled and high-skilled personnel suddenly faced with the need of identifying alternative solutions for surviving and ensuring incomes for the household. This need triggered increasingly higher migration for labour and even employment as low-skilled worker in other more developed European countries, or other regions of the world.

In this context, migration from Romania and Bulgaria up to 2007 already represented 6.4% from the total population of both countries. However, the migration propensity shown by Romanians was somewhat higher, as from total population the estimates indicate a share of about 7.1% from total population in Romania's case [15] (Eurostat statistics).

The explanation is multileveled: the process of institutional building in Romania was already somewhat delayed due to past historical reasons – by the end of the Second World War, the institutions created and existing according to the norms of an emerging and developing capitalist economy were destroyed almost completely by the instauration of the communist regime. In 1989, as all other countries of the communist bloc, Romania had some relevant institutions missing, or under-developed at the time of the Revolution and thereafter institutional-building represented a long and sometimes even convoluted path. An example, with major implications for the labour market and the labour migration propensity was that unemployment was a quasi-unknown labour market institution during the communist period. Of course, unemployment existed also in the period 1950-1989 but it was hidden, oftentimes masked under so-called voluntary initiatives of the youths, but also of all other segments of the working-age population.

After the collapse of the regime by the end of 1989, the massive layoffs of all categories of skilled and unskilled labour force alike due to industrial restructuring, and dismembering the large industrial complexes during the nineties, encouraged the migration for labour behaviour. Hence, many categories of skilled and unskilled workers saw as solution either migrating from the urban to the rural area for surviving based on subsistence-agriculture in their villages of origin, or leaving abroad and accepting very often jobs even under their level of skills.

Not even the end of the nineties and the beginning of the 2000s contributed to reversing the national domestic trend of migration/mobility. At the time of the EU-25 accession, in 2007, the migration behaviour was already consolidated, and the EU accession triggered even higher migration waves, this time of the most productive and high-skilled age segments of the population, youths, and specialised personnel from all fields from health to IT.

Even during the Great Recession, the Romanian migration continued at a swift pace despite the fact that employment chances for this migrant wave were considerably diminished. This fact is also revealed by the UN Report 2015 (United Nations International Migration Report, 2015) where

it is shown that, nowadays, Romania has over 3.5 million citizens living in another country, and that at European level the country takes the fourth position after Great Britain (4.9 million emigrants), Poland (4.4 million) and Germany (4 million). Still, the most worrying fact is that Romania has the second increase rate regarding emigration by a yearly average increase rate of 7.3% after Syria (!) (average yearly increase by 13.1% of the emigration rate in this conflict affected country) and before Poland (5.1%), and India (4.5%) [16].

Already at the beginnings of Romanian migration, some characteristics became noticeable: the main migration directions were towards Mediterranean countries, and Western Europe. The largest Romanian Diasporas are found in Spain and Italy. For instance, for 2014, in Spain were estimated about 950000 Romanians, representing approximately 16% from total immigrants to Spain (Adevarul, April 2015). This figure expressed also a decrease by 8.6% against the preceding year. In Italy, the number of Romanians is in absolute values of 1151395 on 1 January 2016 as this is the country with the largest Romanian Diaspora on the European continent, and the weight of Romanian citizens is of 22.9% in total immigrants to Italy (Dossier Statistico Immigrazione, 2016). Romanians from Italy develop the majority of their activities in constructions 64.4%, trade 11.8% and 4.7% in business services.

In Germany, the share of Romanians is 1% in total immigrants, yet the most remarkable phenomenon is noticed for the years 2014 and 2015. If in 2014 to the Romanians already in Germany were added another 75.132 thousand Romanian citizens, and Romania was on the first position with respect to the number of immigrants, in 2015 the number of Romanian immigrants added was of yet another 92.346 thousand new immigrants and clearly on increase; however, in this year (2015) Romania ranked second, as the ‘Syria effect’ made its impact felt (Zuwanderungsmonitor 2015, and 2016).

Also in Great Britain the number of Romanian immigrants began increasing already in 2013, before the elimination of labour market restrictions on 1 January 2014, and the number of immigrants from Romania increased significantly after this date. Thus, the estimates for the time interval April-June 2015 indicated an increase by 30% against the comparable period of 2014 and a total of 178 thousand Romanians and Bulgarians active on the UK labour market. Another caveat is necessary, as the period of their effective entry into Great Britain is uncertain (gov.uk. archived content).

Motivations for Romanian migration either temporary or definitive are relatively the same for the pre- and post-crisis period: at individual level the decision to migrate for labour is based on incentives regarding better wages, better career development opportunities, and better chances of setting up a family. At society’s level, the decision is the outcome of still unsolved issues in several relevant economic and social areas: first, the labour market continues to show (as most other EU countries) rigidities, but most of all, is lacking actual incentives: many consider that leaving aside wage-earnings, also promotion and career advancement are relevant and the labour market policies have failed – up to present – to ensure a clear and predictable path.

In the case of youths, the educational opportunities provided by western universities, either within the EU, or at global level are far better with respect to employment perspectives and chances, as they offer curricula closer to the demands of a dynamic labour market at the beginning of the 21st century.

However, despite the rigidities shown by other EU and world labour markets, some differences are noticeable, in particular on analysing the institutional aspects. In this respect, the common factors determining the migration for labour can be identified at institutional level, in the field of better and functional labour market reforms that increased possibilities of access to the labour market, higher flexibility, and more opportunities for future personal and career development. For Italy and Spain, next to formal institutional conditions and characteristics, also informal institutions contributed due the common language and historical heritage based on a somewhat shared history and national ‘Latin’ characteristics.

These institutional arrangement elements are even stronger in the case of the young generation increasingly more attracted by the migration for education – in fact, a first step perceived as guaranteeing opportunities of flexible and predictable employment, career and personal fulfilment, by contrast to the main indicators of institutional performance and good governance between Romania and other member-states of the EU.

Nevertheless, the refugee crisis of 2015 has indicated that labour market reforms at EU-level are necessary first to encourage higher mobility between macro-regions, and regions inside the EU and for better filtering priorities regarding the objectives of full-employment at EU-level. This crisis has shown that the stress level of the European labour market needs to be assessed in order to mitigate trends that risk to increase levels of anxiety, populism and xenophobia, all of the latter being manifest after the respective crisis and not only regarding refugees and asylum seekers, but also other migrants from the EU New Member States.

3. Migration for education – main institutional framework issues

If the first migration waves from Romania were due to transition and the desire to ensure better income and living standards abroad even at the cost of performing low-skilled activities under the actual level, or an expression of high-skilled migration that was lacking opportunities for developing professional activities at the expected level of the often high- and edge-skills, nowadays, the most concerning phenomenon is the one of youths opting increasingly more for continuing/finalising their higher education or training abroad.

Some of the last estimates indicate that almost 70.000 Romanian planned in the period 2015-2016 to identify license/master/doctor studies opportunities abroad (Ziarul Financiar, September, 2016). The options were biased – contrary to the options of those migrating for labour – preponderantly towards Great Britain, Denmark, and the Netherlands, but without restriction to these options only. Moreover, yearly according to the group in charge of organizing the Romanian International University Fair, over 6000 young individuals identify such options. At these Fair participate 100 universities yearly; however, Romanian universities are underrepresented as only 10% participate to the fair. These estimates from the period 2014-2016 show that, in general, it might be considered an estimated growth of the yearly rate of young individuals interested in studying abroad of about 6%, while to the above-mentioned preferred destinations are added France, Germany and the United States. From among these options, the most issues are posed by the relations to Great Britain – if before Brexit – Romanian young individuals could access governmental loans as European citizens, the new legislation of UK in this respect is still in need of clarification. The system of governmental loans or low schooling taxes exists also in the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, France and Germany.

A survey realised in 2014, by the League of Romanian Students Abroad on a sample of 1074 respondents, draws attention to the essential motivations. The Survey as well as other of its details and findings, along with the research method and instrument, is available online.

The main motivations are: the educational offer associated with technical endowments and teaching staff performances, along with the prestige of the universities in the EU and the world. This order is also according to the survey mentioned-above – an approximately good indicator regarding options after studies' conclusion. It highlights a concern-raising trend about the intention of not returning to the country, the reasons called upon being related to access on the labour market, opportunities of opening businesses, and opportunities of social nature, such as obtaining/purchasing a house and setting up a family, small and white collar corruption, etc. Wages have also an important role regarding options, but they come second when compared with the opportunities provided based on attractiveness degree of the job/position.

The platform provided by this survey is the more useful in the current context when it is pursued to (re)consolidate the institutions on the labour market with direct impact on the minimum

guaranteed wage, on full employment according to professional/vocational training and other targets having as final objective the sustainable economic growth of Romania up to the time horizon 2030.

The initiatives should consider that for young individuals to return to the country after studying abroad, labour market institutions should provide answers about access on labour market, in direct correlation with diplomas acknowledgement/recognition, and ensuring increased opportunities for continuing training, internship, fellowship and traineeship programmes, thus creating the framework for better professional continuity and predictability.

Among the most important issues would be simplifying procedures for diploma recognition and creating and managing improvement programmes of internship, traineeship, and apprenticeship. Just entering into the labour market does not mean – from the perspective of these young individuals – the guarantee of career predictability and development according to the gained level of education and training. The lacking institutional setting is noticeable both at formal and informal level. Active labour market policies were, and in some regards still are, on the second position, when compared with passive labour market policies in Romania.

Therefore, an institutional ‘tradition’ of cooperation between potential employers and employees, and the systems that are involved in these processes is still in the making. Thus, youths, but also other categories of workforce are faced oftentimes with problems that are of their own creation – higher expectations as compared with what the public and/or private sector is prepared to pay regarding wages – and the outcome of effective communication and intervention gaps of stakeholders’ systems (education, vocational and continuing training suppliers, employers’ and employees’ associations, alliances and ad-hoc alliances of public and/or private recruitment agencies, etc.) that could assist them, and other segments represented in the labour force to achieve their personal objectives in career, while contributing to ensuring economic growth and welfare at the level of society.

In this respect, it would be necessary to formulate some policies and measures that would assure career predictability, but under conditions adjusted to the evolutions on the labour market that is shaped increasingly more by the digitalised knowledge-economy. This career predictability, in turn, needs to be associated to some measures providing also for the foreseeable evolution of incomes according to progresses and career advancement, so as to be an incentive not only for professing in the country of origin but for continuing the activity in the country for the entire active life. Creating some increased opportunities for opening businesses by young entrepreneurs and putting to good use their innovative potential by removing as much as possible bureaucratic hindrances, along with some measures/solutions for ensuring business mentorship for these young individuals is also regarded as recommendable.

Active labour market policies, for those failing to identify a job should be diversified and intensified as to meet the new flexibility conditions, and the new emerging contractual forms which took shape in the changed context triggered on one hand by the Great Recession and, on the other hand, by the transition to the digitalised society which changes not only the structure of industry and occupations, but also requires new institutional arrangements in the economy, in particular for labour market and the education system.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Beyond the common approach, at EU level continues the drafting of policies for managing migration at each member-state’s level. This state of affairs reflects the existing institutional changes and dynamics at national level regarding labour market and education, and the majority give at least indications about preferences with respect to immigrants from other countries of the world. Nevertheless, with respect to the countries of origin, the majority of the specialised studies show that in the case of migration the possible positive outcomes in the country of origin in the

labour market, on wage increases, or decent working conditions for all categories of employees do not necessarily assure a diminishment of individual migration preferences, but might contribute to reducing emigration flows and to ‘demographic reset’ for countries most affected by migration during the last ten to twenty years. Circular migration could also be one solution [17].

Formal institutions at EU and national level must identify concrete forms for ensuring common governance and management of the phenomenon at EU- and country level. Nevertheless, the situation is different in the case of informal institutions generated by the migrants as these tend to give the shape and direction of future migration waves to certain countries, and areas in the EU and the world. Such informal institutions are created also on the worldwide web where by networking and socialising the young generation influences and contributes, for instance, to the constant increase in the numbers of young Romanian students leaving abroad. In this context, migration in Romania is one of the essential issues that must find answers, because it is necessary to manage the national migration potential, while at the same time preparing and adjusting to the gradual change of Romania into a country of immigration from a country of emigration due to its accession to the EU and to the evolution of the national economy which will impose, finally, due to demographic change, attracting labour force from other regions of the world. The Romanian and European conundrum must, from this perspective find solutions based on targeted, managed, monitored and measurable intervention on the labour market and social services’ institutions, as well as on the ones of the educational system. Only thereby possible initiatives for a common international and/or European governance of the migration phenomena might be achieved [18].

The importance of working towards a common governance framework is shown also by the fact that current disputes at EU-level regarding migrants, refugees and asylum seekers is increasingly more surrounded by initiatives of the member-states aimed to increase for migrants the entry-barriers on national labour markets, while for refugees and asylum seekers the Dublin-system proved to be ineffective [19], which contributed to increased anxiety and contestation at national level in the member-states. However, the issues of global governance of migration, and of EU- and member-states’ policies especially with respect to labour migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers cannot be solved unless some formal and informal institutions related to confidence, solidarity and shared principles are reformed in accordance with the trends of migration as phenomenon in the 21st century.

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